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Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition 
Bronwyn H. Hall, Stuart J. H. Graham, Dietmar Harhoff, and David C. Mowery 
 
 “This is an agency in crisis, and it's going to get worse if we don't change our 
dynamic. It doesn't do me any good to pretend there's not a problem when there is.” 
James E. Rogan, appointed director of the USPTO in December 2001, as quoted in 
the Los Angeles Times, February 7, 2003. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in the 1980s, a series of administrative, judicial, and legislative actions 
strengthened the economic value of U.S. patents and extended their coverage in such 
areas as computer software and “business methods.” Partly as a result of these changes, 
patent applications in the United States continue to grow (see Figure 1) and the resources 
available to the patent office have not kept pace. The fraction of patents granted within 
two years of application has fallen from 85 percent in the early 1990s to about 70 percent 
in the late 1990s. At April 2002 hearings before the House Subcommittee on Courts, the 
Internet and Intellectual Property, Commissioner Rogan stated that “Average pendency 
surpassed 24 months in 1999, and we expect it to average 26.5 months this year (2002).” 
 
A second consequence of these changes has been an increase in patent litigation and a 
more recent increase in patent litigation rates. In a study of patent litigation between 1978 
and 1995, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2002) found that the rate of litigation rose only 
slightly between the 1978-84 and the 1991-95 periods, from 19 to 21 suits per thousand 
patents, with some variation across technology areas. Somaya (2002a) suggests that this 
rate rose again in the late 1990s. In a new and comprehensive study of patent litigation 
focusing on cases that terminated in 1998-2000, Allison et al. (2003) report a litigation 
rate of approximately 32 suits per thousand patents. Whether or not litigation per patent 
issued has increased substantially, the fact remains that the absolute amount of litigation 
has grown enormously, increasing both the private and public costs of the system as a 
whole.  
 
Although many of the administrative, legal and judicial changes in policy affecting patent 
validity, examination, and value were undertaken at the behest of the U.S. business 
community, concerns have been raised about the potential economic burdens of low-
quality patents in an environment of greater deference to the rights of the patentholder 
(Merges 1999; Barton 2000; Kingston 2001). It is therefore not surprising that a number 
of experts have suggested that the U.S. patent examination system does not currently 
impose a sufficiently rigorous review of patent and nonpatent prior art, resulting in the 
issuing of patents of considerable breadth and insufficient quality and that this problem 
has worsened in recent years. Many of these critics advocate the reform or extension of 
procedures that would enable interested parties other than U.S. Patent and Trademark Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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Office (USPTO) examiners to bring relevant information to bear on this process either 
before or shortly after the issue of a patent 
 
The present paper reviews the prospects for improving the operation of the patent system 
and lowering its cost by changing the administrative process at the USPTO. At present, 
the primary administrative procedure for a challenge to the validity of a U.S. patent is the 
“reexamination” proceeding, which may be initiated by any party during the life of the 
patent. A more elaborate and adversarial procedure for challenging the validity of patents 
in the immediate aftermath of their issue is the “opposition proceeding” that is used by 
the European Patent Office (EPO). A number of scholars, both legal and economic, have 
advocated the introduction of such a system in the United States, or a strengthening of the 
re-examination system in order to improve the quality of patents and to increase the 
likelihood that relevant prior art is brought to bear, especially in new subject matter areas 
(see Hall 2003 for a summary of these views). In this paper we consider the likely effects 
of introducing such an post-grant review process in the U.S. patent system, focusing in 
particular on the ability of such a process to improve the “quality” of patents and reduce 
the length of time that the current reliance on litigation requires to ascertain the validity 
of the relatively valuable patents that are contested in court. Our assessment of the 
benefits and costs of a U.S. post-grant patent review system draws on our previous work 
(Graham et al. 2003), as well as that of Janis (1997) on alternatives to the re-examination 
procedures and Levin and Levin (2002) for models of strategic litigation and opposition 
behavior. 
 
We begin by reviewing the current causes of concern about the operation of the U.S. 
patent system, focusing on the patent quality issues that such a system might be designed 
to improve. We then describe the institutional background and administrative structure of 
the U.S. and European patent systems. Readers who are already familiar with the patent 
system or who are not interested in the institutional detail may wish to skip this section. 
The final sections of the paper compare the operation of the two patent systems and then 
present a simple welfare analysis of the expected costs and benefits of introducing a more 
adversarial administrative challenge system.  
2 THE  PROBLEM 
Patent quality 
What do we mean by patent quality? From the perspective of economic welfare, granting 
the property right described by a patent involves trading off the gain from providing an 
incentive for innovation against the deadweight loss implied by the possibility of a 
monopoly during the patent term. The statutory definition of a patentable invention is that 
it be novel, non-obvious, and have utility.
1 Both the economic and legal view suggest that 
high quality patents are those which describe an invention that is truly “new,” rather than 
an invention that is already in widespread use but not yet patented.
2 See Table 1 for some 
                                                 
1 See Lunney (2001) for an argument that the non-obviousness test has been weakened since the creation of 
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in 1982. 
2 Presumably, if the invention has already been reduced to practice by others, the potential gain from 
incenting an inventor is zero, so we are left only with the deadweight loss from monopoly.  Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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examples of patents that appear to violate this definition, mostly because there is prior art 
that is not easily searchable in written form.  
 
Besides the three statutory requirements, a fourth criterion for granting a patent on an 
invention is that the patent application must disclose sufficient details about the 
invention. Patents thus serve another social purpose, since these disclosures in the 
published patent can facilitate knowledge spillovers to others who might use or improve 
upon the invention. Another criterion for a “high-quality patent” therefore is that it enable 
those “skilled in the art” to comprehend the invention well enough to use the patent 
document for implementation of the described invention. This dimension of patent 
quality, however, is less likely to be affected by post-grant opposition proceedings. 
 
From a social welfare perspective, an important characteristic of a high quality patent is 
that there be relatively little uncertainty over the breadth of its claims, i.e., over what 
specific features of a technical advance are claimed under the terms of the patent, as well 
as whether these claims are likely to be upheld in legal proceedings following the issue of 
the patent. Uncertainty about the validity of a patent has several potential costs: such 
uncertainty may cause the patentholder to underinvest in the technology, it could reduce 
investment by potential competitors in competing technical advances, and it may lead to 
costly litigation after both the holder and potential competitors have sunk sizable 
investments.  
Consequences of low patent quality 
Although some scholars, notably Lemley (2001), have argued that the costs of having 
higher quality patents may exceed the benefits, recent experience suggests that there are 
some unintended consequences in the form of complicating property rights and feedback 
effects. In this section we review the arguments for increasing patent quality.  
 
”Low-quality patents” can create considerable uncertainty among inventors or would-be 
commercializers of inventions and slow either the pace of innovation or investment in the 
commercialization of new technologies. Lerner (1995) has shown that fear of litigation 
may cause smaller entrant firms to avoid areas where incumbents hold large numbers of 
patents. Such “entry-avoidance” may be rational and even welfare-enhancing if the 
incumbents’ patents are known for certain to be valid, but low quality patents held by 
incumbents may also deter entry into a technological area if the costs of invalidating the 
patents is too high. In these circumstances, technological alternatives may not be 
commercialized and consumer welfare suffers. 
 
The lack of relatively rapid processes for resolving patent validity and ensuring higher 
patent quality also may slow the pace of invention in fields characterized by “cumulative 
invention,” i.e., those in which one inventor’s efforts rely on previous technical advances 
or advances in complementary technologies. But if these previous technical advances are 
covered by patents of dubious validity or excessive breadth, the costs to inventors of 
pursuing the inventions that rely on them may be so high as to discourage such 
“cumulative” invention. Alternatively, large numbers of low-quality patents may 
dramatically increase the level of “fragmentation” of property rights covering prior-Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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generation or complementary technologies, raising the transaction costs for inventors of 
obtaining access (e.g., through licenses) to these technologies. Finally, the issue of a large 
number of low-quality patents will increase uncertainty among inventors concerning the 
level of protection enjoyed by these related inventions, which in turn will make it more 
costly and difficult for inventors to build on these related inventions in their own 
technical advances.  
 
The issuance of low-quality patents also is likely to spur significant increases in patent 
applications, further straining the already overburdened examination processes of the 
USPTO. A kind of vicious circle may result, in which cursory examinations of patent 
applications result in the issue of low-quality patents, which triggers rapid growth in 
applications, further taxing the limited resources of the USPTO, further limiting the 
examination of individual applications, and further degrading the quality of patents. 
 
Recent decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), the specialized 
appeals court for patent cases, concerning the validity of “important” patents (those 
deemed sufficiently valuable by patentholder or competitor to litigate and appeal) create 
still another reason for serious consideration of a nonjudicial process for post-issue 
validity challenges. For example, in 2002 the CAFC ruled that the PTO had incorrectly 
rejected two applications for “obviousness,” arguing that if an examiner rejects an 
application using “general knowledge,” that knowledge “must be articulated and placed 
on the record.”
3 According to deputy commissioner Esther Kepplinger, this means “we 
can’t reject something just because it’s stupid.”
4 This decision could significantly weaken 
the level of scrutiny provided by the already costly and overcrowded patent-litigation 
system. A system that enabled third parties (including competitors) to bring such 
knowledge (in the form of written prior art) to bear on the patent could help in making an 
obviousness determination.  
 
The U.S. patent system, no less than those of other advanced industrial economies, is 
very much a political creation. Its development and frequent alterations at the hands of 
the U.S. Congress reflect changes in the balance of political power among corporate 
inventors, independent inventors, the broader research community, and the general 
public. It is hardly an accident, after all, that the most recent series of changes in the U.S. 
and international patent systems were undertaken by U.S. political actors during the 
throes of the “competitiveness crisis” of the 1980s. And the increased economic stakes in 
intellectual property resulting from these policy changes, as well as the broader shift to a 
“knowledge-based economy,” are likely to complicate reforms of such potentially far-
reaching scope as the introduction of a more elaborate system for post-grant validity 
challenges (indeed, the re-examination process that we discuss below was considerably 
weakened during debate over its passage by the Congress). Nevertheless, consideration of 
                                                 
3 This decision presumably made it more difficult to reject such patents as US 6368227, the patent on a 
swinging method that uses a technique known by children for years, but not placed “on the record.” Note 
that this particular patent has been subject to a re-examination request of the U.S. Patent Commissioner 
because of the publicity it received. The problem with patents like this is not necessarily that they are 
enforceable in the courts, but that they clog the system and raise its total cost.  
4 As quoted on the Los Angeles Times, February 7, 2003. Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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any such reforms must begin with an analysis of their operation in other industrial-
economy patent systems. The remainder of this paper examines the EPO opposition 
system and compares its operation and outcomes with those of the existing administrative 
process for patent-validity challenges in the United States, the “re-examination.”  
therefore,  
 
3 INSTITUTIONAL  BACKGROUND 
The U.S. and European patent systems have similar aims and requirements for 
patentability but differ in the allowable subject matter and in their administrative 
procedures. As we noted earlier, the U.S. system requires that an invention (“process, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter”) satisfy four requirements to be 
patentable: adequate disclosure, novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness. In Europe, 
firms and individuals have been able since 1978 to submit a single application to the 
European Patent Office that specifies up to 24 national jurisdictions in which they desire 
patent protection for an invention. Under the EPO regime, the patentability requirements 
-- adequate disclosure, novelty, industrial application, and inventive step -- are broadly 
similar but not identical to those of the United States.  
 
The median time between application and patent issue in the U.S. system during the 
1980s and 1990s was 18 months to 2 years (with a long “tail” of patent applications with 
much longer pendency), and in the EPO was slightly more than 4 years. As part of the 
patent system harmonization legislated in the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, 
the United States instituted a policy of publication 18 months after application in 
November 2000 for many patents with applications pending in jurisdictions outside the 
United States. In contrast, EPO applications have always been published with an 18-
month lag, regardless of whether they have issued. 
 
Both systems have a postgrant procedure through which the validity of the patent can be 
challenged by other parties, but the two patent systems’ postgrant challenge procedures 
differ significantly. In both systems, interested parties can also bring suit in court over 
infringement and validity (with some restrictions as to when a suit can be filed). We 
discuss these administrative processes for postgrant challenges in the following sections. 
USPTO Examination and Reexamination Procedures 
In the United States, inventors may claim a utility patent by making application to the 
USPTO. Before a patent issues, the USPTO is charged with ensuring that the invention is 
adequately specified, covers patentable subject matter, and is useful, novel, and 
nonobvious. Procedurally, the application must be filed within 1 year of the invention’s 
public use or publication, contain an adequate description with one or more claims, and 
be accompanied by the payment of a fee. 
 
The USPTO patent examiner is the arbiter of the patentability, novelty, usefulness, and 
nonobviousness requirements cited above, judging these standards against the “prior art,” 
i.e., prior inventions, in the field. Prosecution of the patent has been characterized as a 
“give-and-take affair,” with negotiation and renegotiation between the patentee and the Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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examiner that ordinarily continues for 2–3 years (Merges et al.., 1997).The costs of 
prosecuting a patent through the USPTO range from $5,000 to $100,000 (including the 
USPTO issue fee), depending on the nature of the technology. 
 
Reexamination, originally envisioned as an alternative to expensive and time-consuming 
litigation, was created by the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act. The legislative history of this act 
suggests that the reexamination was intended to be a mechanism that would be less 
expensive and less time-consuming than litigation.
5 During the legislative process, 
however, the act was purged of its intended adversarial characteristics, reducing the 
usefulness of the procedure for opponents of a given patent. 
 
Procedurally, the reexamination proceeding permits the patent owner or any other party 
to notify the USPTO and request that the grounds on which the patent was originally 
issued be reconsidered by an examiner. Initiation of a reexamination requires that some 
previously undisclosed “new” and relevant piece of prior art be presented to the agency. 
Under the statute, a relevant disclosure must be printed in either a prior patent or prior 
publication—no other source can serve as grounds for the reexamination. 
 
After being initiated by notification and the payment of a fee to the USPTO, the 
reexamination goes forward only if the USPTO finds a “substantial new question of 
patentability.” Such a determination was intended by lawmakers to prevent the reopening 
of issues deemed settled in the original examination (Merges, 1997). The USPTO must 
make this determination within 3 months of the request and, having made the 
determination, must notify the patent owner.  
 
When the owner is not the reexamination proponent (about half the cases), the patentee is 
allowed to file a response to the newly discovered prior art within 2 months. If the owner 
chooses to respond, the requester is afforded an opportunity to reply within 2 months. By 
choosing not to respond, the owner can limit the requester’s participation in the process. 
The reexamination is an ex parte proceeding between the patent owner and the USPTO 
that provides limited opportunities for third-party involvement.
 6  
 
The party requesting a re-examination is entitled to notify the USPTO of the triggering 
“prior art,” to receive a copy of the patentee’s reply to the reexamination (if any), and to 
file a response to that reply. The owner’s role in the process is much more involved: The 
                                                 
5   Our evidence (Graham et al. 2003) suggests that the average reexamination takes less than 2 years, 
slightly shorter than the average duration of a patent lawsuit (31 months). But this difference is not 
large (especially in view of the high variance of the “average duration” estimate for a trial); some 
observers have criticized the reexamination system for not having provided a fast and cheap alternative 
to trial.  
6    An alternative reexamination procedure, the inter partes reexamination, was enacted by the U.S. 
Congress in 1999 (see the American Inventors Protection Act, codified in 35 USC 311-318. Several 
commentators have questioned the efficacy of the inter partes reexamination on grounds that it allows 
the third-party requestor limited opportunities of involvement, prevents any adverse findings of the 
USPTO from being appealed to the courts, and also precludes the raising of any questions of validity on 
grounds that were, or may have, been raised during the inter partes reexamination from being litigated 
in the courts (Neifeld 2000). The USPTO reports no inter partes re-examination requests in 2000 and 
one in 2001, suggesting that the procedure has been little used in practice. Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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reexamination statute contemplates a second examination, with the same type of “give-
and-take” negotiation between owner and patent office that occurs during the initial 
issuance of a patent. The examiner remains the final arbiter of the process, and it is not 
uncommon for the original examiner to be assigned the follow-up reexamination, thus 
putting the question of whether prior art was overlooked in the hands of the same 
government official who was responsible for ensuring that no prior art was overlooked in 
the previous search. 
 
Once the reexamination goes forward, however, the statute requires that the 
Commissioner make a validity determination. The original patent is afforded no statutory 
presumption of validity in the proceeding, although the practice of assigning 
reexaminations to the original examiner may produce such a presumption. The 
reexamination cannot be abandoned or postponed to await the result of concurrent 
litigation proceedings, although it may be stayed during other USPTO proceedings, 
including reissue or interferences. A reexamination may result in the cancellation of all or 
some of the claims in a patent or the confirmation of all or some of the claims. Nothing in 
the reexamination procedure can expand the scope of the original patent’s claims, but 
claims may be amended or new claims added during the renegotiation between the patent 
owner and the examiner. 
 
In summary, for parties seeking to invalidate an issued patent, the reexamination 
procedure involves considerable costs and risks. The filing fee for the reexamination is 
substantial, and practitioners estimate the average costs of a reexamination at $10,000–
$100,000 depending on the complexity of the matter. Although the costs of a 
reexamination are lower than those of litigation ($1–3 million), the third-party challenger 
in reexamination is denied a meaningful role in the process, and the patentholder 
maintains communications with the examining officer, offering amendments or adding 
new claims during the reexamination. Reexamination may make it more difficult for 
challengers to prevail in patent-validity litigation, because juries tend to give added 
weight to reexamined patents. Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
indicated that claims confirmed by the reexamining officer present added barriers to a 
successful contest.
7 As a result, challengers face powerful incentives to forego 
reexamination in favor of litigation, a process that may well be more expensive, more 
time-consuming, and less expert in testing post-issue validity. 
Patent Litigation in the United States 
In the United States, post-issue validity can also be tested in court. Procedurally, 
litigation differs markedly from the reexamination procedure. Unlike the reexamination 
procedure, litigation is an adversarial proceeding in which the litigant may elect to have 
the case heard by either a judge or a jury. Because patent suits generally arise from a 
charge of infringement by the patent owner, the patentee exerts considerable control over 
the timing of enforcement and litigation in a patent dispute.
8 
                                                 
7  Kaufman Company v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970 (CAFC, 1986) (suggesting that evidentiary burdens 
are likely higher for challengers after reexamination). 
8    This owner initiation occurs in many cases in which declaratory validity determinations are being 
sought by a challenger third party: These suits, which make the patentee the defendant, are often Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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Legal standards create a relatively hostile environment in the federal courts for 
challengers seeking to invalidate an issued patent. Under the statute, patents are “born 
valid,” enjoying a presumption of validity during the court proceedings. Furthermore, the 
evidentiary standard for proving a claim invalid is “clear and convincing” evidence, a 
standard considerably higher than the mere “preponderance” of proof required in the 
typical civil suit. Because judges and juries may have limited technical expertise, these 
presumptions and evidentiary barriers create high costs for challengers. The “pro-patent” 
judicial philosophy promulgated by the CAFC since its creation has compounded these 
barriers: According to one study, successful challenges to patent validity fell from 50 
percent to 33 percent in the years after the creation of the CAFC (Lemley and Allison, 
1998). 
 
Direct costs in litigation are also high compared with those of reexamination. Estimates 
of legal costs in patent litigation run from half a million dollars to three million dollars 
per suit depending on the amount at risk (AIPLA, 2001) or to $500,000 per claim at 
issue, per side (Barton, 2000). One important driver of these costs is the extensive use of 
pretrial discovery. The lag between filing a patent suit and reaching a resolution can also 
be considerable: one study estimates the average length of a District Court patent suit at 
31 months (Magrab, 1993).  
 
But, in fact, very few patent suits actually go to trial, as reported in Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2002), who find that approximately 95 per cent of all patent suits settle 
either before or during trial. 78 per cent settle even before the pre-trial hearing, an 
additional 16 per cent settle before trial, and one per cent settle during trial. The median 
length of time to settlement is 8 months, 16 months, and 25 months, respectively, 
implying that the average or median time to a litigation outcome is somewhat less than 
the 31 months reported by Magrab. This does not mean that litigation is not costly, since 
according to the surveys conducted by the AIPLA, about half of the estimated legal costs 
of litigation are incurred before the end of the discovery phase (AIPLA, 2001). It also 
does not mean that the social costs of a patent are avoided, since settlement before trial is 
likely to lead to a collusive outcome. 
EPO Examination and Opposition Procedures 
Patent protection for European signatories to the European Patent Convention states can 
be obtained by filing several national applications at the respective national patent offices 
or by filing one EPO patent application at the European Patent Office. The EPO 
application designates the EPC member states for which patent protection is requested.
9 
The total cost of a European patent amounts to approximately €29,800, roughly three 
                                                                                                                                                 
initiated only after a demand by the patentholder for the challenger to stop infringing the patent, thus 
putting the initial move in the hands of the patentholder. 
9    The Convention on the Grant of European Patents, also referred to here as the European Patent 
Convention (EPC) was enacted in October of 1973. It is the legal foundation for the establishment of 
the EPO. The full text of the convention is available at http://www3.european-patent-
office.org/dwld/epc/epc_2000.pdf.  Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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times as much as a typical national application.
10 Thus, if patent protection is sought for 
more than three designated states, the application for a European patent is less expensive 
than independent applications in several jurisdictions. This cost advantage has made the 
European filing path particularly attractive for applicants selling goods and services in 
multiple European markets. Increases in the number of patent applications and grants 
have given the EPO a level of economic importance that now resembles that of the 
USPTO. 
 
EPO patent grants are issued for inventions that are novel, mark an inventive step, are 
commercially applicable, and are not excluded from patentability for other reasons. After 
the filing of an EPO application, The Hague EPO office produces a “search report” for 
the applicant. The search report describes the state of prior art regarded as relevant 
according to EPO guidelines for the patentability of the invention, i.e., it contains a list of 
references to prior patents and/or nonpatent sources. Unlike in the U.S. system, applicants 
at the EPO are not required to supply a full list of prior art (see Michel and Bettels, 2001, 
191ff). Within 6 months after the announcement of the publication of the search report in 
the EP Bulletin, applicants can request the examination of their application. This request 
is a compulsory prerequisite for the patent grant. If examination is not requested, the 
patent application is deemed to be withdrawn. Eighteen months after the priority date the 
patent application is published. At this point, the application is normally under 
examination; thus the patent owner is generally required to reveal some information 
about his/her invention before the grant of the patent and even if no patent is ever issued. 
 
After examination (if requested) has been performed, the EPO either informs the 
applicant that the patent will be granted as specified in the original application or requires 
the applicant to agree to changes in the application that are necessary for the patent grant. 
In the latter case, a negotiation process similar to that in the U.S. system follows. Once 
the applicant and the EPO have agreed on the scope of the allowable subject matter, the 
patent issues for the designated states and is translated into the relevant national 
languages. If the EPO declines to grant a patent, the applicant may file an appeal. Within 
9 months after the patent has been granted, any third party can oppose the European 
patent centrally at the EPO by filing an opposition against the granting decision. The 
outcome of the opposition procedure is binding for all designated states. If opposition is 
not filed within 9 months after the grant, the patent’s validity can only be challenged 
under the legal rules of the respective designated countries. The EPO opposition 
procedure is thus the only centralized challenge process for European patents. 
 
An EPO patent opponent must file an opposition with the EPO and present evidence that 
the prerequisites for patentability were not fulfilled, e.g., the opponent must show that the 
invention lacked novelty and/or an inventive step or that the disclosure was poor or 
                                                 
10  At the time of writing the exchange rate is approximately 0.93 euros per dollar. As in other patent 
systems, the official patent office fees are a relatively small part of the costs (in this case €4,300. 
Professional representation before the EPO amounts to €5,500 on average, whereas translation into the 
languages of eight contracting states requires €11,500. Renewal fees for a patent maintained for 10 
years amount to roughly €8,500. See “Cost of an average European patent as at 1.7.99”, 
http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/new/kosten_e.pdf￿  (Jan. 14, 2002). Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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insufficient. At the EPO, an opposition division determines the outcome. The examiner 
who granted the patent is a member of the three-person opposition chamber but may not 
be the chairperson. The opposition procedure can have one of three outcomes: The patent 
may be upheld without amendments, it may be amended, or it may be revoked. Data on 
opposition outcomes reported in Graham et al. (2003) indicate that revocation occurs in 
about one-third of all opposition cases. 
 
Another interesting aspect of the opposition procedure concerns the restrictions imposed 
by this process on the opponent’s ability to settle “out of court.” Once an opposition is 
filed, the EPO can choose to pursue the case on its own, even if the opposition is 
withdrawn. Thus the opponent and patentholder may not be free to settle their case 
outside of the EPO opposition process once the opposition is filed. This provision of the 
opposition proceeding may discourage its use by opponents seeking to force 
patentholders to license their patents. 
 
Both the patentholder(s) and the opponent(s) may appeal the outcome of the opposition 
procedure. The appeal must be filed within 2 months after receipt of the decision of the 
opposition division, and it must be substantiated within an additional 2 months. The 
Board of Appeal affords the final opportunity at the EPO to test the validity of the 
contested European patent. Both parties can bring expert witnesses into the proceedings, 
and there are various options for having deadlines extended. Graham et al. report that the 
median duration of the challenge procedures (opposition and any appeal) is about three 
years, although there is considerable variation in the duration of individual cases (the 
interquartile range is also about three years).  
 
The official fee for filing an opposition is €613; for filing an appeal against the outcome 
of opposition, the fee is €1022. However, the total costs to an opponent or the 
patentholder are much higher. Estimates by patent attorneys of the costs of an opposition 
range between €15,000 and €25,000 for each party. Patent attorneys we interviewed 
agreed that opponents have limited ability to drive up the patentholders’ costs by filing an 
opposition (in contrast to litigation in the United States), since attorney fees are regulated 
in most European countries, including Germany, where many patent lawyers who have 
the required EPO registration reside. 
Patent Litigation in Europe 
One desirable feature of the EPO opposition system is its centralized structure within the 
fragmented European legal system for patent challenges. As we noted earlier, patent 
litigation affecting EPO patents is conducted at the national level. The centralized nature 
of the EPO opposition process thus arguably is more important in this context than in the 
United States, where the federal courts operate as a more unified system. Nonetheless, a 
full evaluation of the effects of the EPO opposition system requires some consideration 
of the possibilities for litigation, which are not precluded by the opposition proceeding.  
 
There have been very few systematic studies of patent litigation within the various 
European nations, and we therefore confine ourselves to a brief review of the few facts 
that are known. Outcomes in the “local” litigation processes involving EPO patents are Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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restricted to the “local” level, e.g., the patent may be invalidated in Spain, but this does 
not affect its validity in Italy. During the past decade, national patent courts have 
increasingly taken evidence and decisions from litigation in other European nations into 
account, but no systematic study has analyzed such legal “spillover” effects (Stauder, 
1996; Stauder et al.. 1999).  
 
The differences among national jurisdictions within Europe are enormous, requiring 
substantial investments in each national suit and driving up the costs of challenging the 
national patents emerging from an EPO grant in several of the designated states. The 
costs of litigation in any national court have been estimated to be between €50,000 and 
€500,000, depending on the complexity of the case. This cost structure makes an attack at 
the European level with the opposition procedure particularly attractive for a current or 
potential competitor of the patentholder. The litigation rate (computed as the number of 
cases for which a suit is filed divided by the number of patents) in most European 
countries is roughly 1 percent, slightly lower than the 1.9 percent reported for the United 
States (Stauder, 1996, 1989; Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001). However, recent 
estimates by Cremers (2003) suggest that the litigation rate may as high in Germany as in 
the United States, on the order of 2.1 per cent.
11 At this juncture, all that can be said is 
that the quantitative evidence is too sparse to conclude from these figures that the 
existence of the opposition mechanism leads to a reduction in litigation or in litigation 
cost. 
4  Comparing the two systems 
In Graham et al. (2003), we compared the operation of the post-issue re-examination and 
opposition systems for challenging patent validity in the U.S. and drew some conclusions 
about the differences between an ex parte system such as is currently found in the U. S. 
and an inter partes system used in Europe. First, the U.S. reexamination procedure differs 
dramatically from the EPO opposition procedure in virtually all of its features. The two 
most important are that re-examinations are much less common, with an overall average 
rate of 0.2%, in contrast to the European opposition rate of about 8%, and that the 
identity of the party requesting a reexamination is the patent owner in at least 44% of the 
cases, lowering the effective rate even more. This characteristic of reexamination hardly 
qualifies it as the sort of adversarial procedure that EPO oppositions represent.  
 
We also found that EPO oppositions resolved validity challenges more slowly than 
USPTO reexamination proceedings. Indeed, opposition proceedings in some cases (and 
almost certainly in important, complex cases with numerous opponents, appeals, etc.) 
may well take as much time to be resolved as litigation in the U.S. system. Nonetheless, 
the higher frequency of EPO opposition as compared to U.S. re-examination or litigation 
is at least consistent with the hypothesis that the opposition process handles many more 
                                                 
11 Using data from court filings in Mannheim and Duesseldorf, Cremers identifies 715 patent infringement 
cases involving 905 patents during the 1993-1995 period. These courts account for about 55-60 per cent 
of all cases filed in Germany. The three year average of EPO patents issued since 1980 that included 
Germany as one of the covered regions is about 71,000, for a litigation probability of about 2.1 per cent, 
assuming the process is stationary.  Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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legal disputes over patent validity than are addressed by the U.S. reexamination process 
and at a lower cost than the U.S. litigation process.
12 
 
Our analysis of the outcomes of the re-examination and opposition system outcomes 
confirmed that the adversarial nature of the opposition system was more likely to lead to 
outcomes unfavorable to the patent holder. In Table 2 we show the distribution of 
outcomes for all re-examinations and all oppositions of patents over the past twenty 
years. It is clear from the table that patent revocation is much more likely when a patent 
is opposed in Europe (one in three is revoked) than when a patent is re-examined in the 
United States (only one in ten is revoked). Combined with the lower probability of re-
examination, the overall probability that a patent is revoked via a post-grant 
administrative challenge is 3 percent in Europe and essentially zero (0.02 percent) in the 
United States. Conversely, re-examination is more likely than opposition to lead to 
amendment of the patent, whether or not the patent owner initiated the process.  
 
Our analysis also indicated that patent amendment, rather than revocation, is more likely 
for oppositions in relatively new fields of inventive activity, for more “complex” patents, 
or for oppositions in which numerous opponents participate. Because we lack evidence 
on the extent to which oppositions are followed by litigation in the European patent 
system, we were unable to determine whether the lack of any “speed advantage” for 
oppositions in resolving patent disputes quickly is offset by a reduction of litigation rates 
associated with oppositions. The EPO system may offer few advantages over the U.S. 
system for post-issue patent challenges, but we cannot address this issue without 
analyzing litigation data for both the U.S. and European systems. Any truly 
comprehensive assessment of the social costs and benefits of the two challenge systems 
requires that we consider both the “patent office” processes of postgrant challenge 
(opposition or reexamination) and litigation. Nevertheless, we present a simple version of 
such an analysis in the next section of the paper.  
 
Although an EPO opposition must be filed within 9 months of patent issue, it does not 
reach a conclusion more rapidly than the US re-examination procedure, if we estimate the 
total time lag as the length of time from patent application date to final resolution. The 
average lag between application date and the initiation of a challenge is substantially 
greater within the US re-examinations than in the EPO oppositions, but this difference 
reflects the different time limits on the initiation of such proceedings. Should we 
conclude from these comparative data that the longer lags in the EPO opposition system 
imply a lengthier period of uncertainty, legal expense, and therefore, a higher welfare 
burden within the innovation systems of these economies? Such a conclusion is 
unfounded, since it relies on a characterization of the re-examination and opposition 
proceedings as analogous in their characteristics, rigor, and outcomes. The data presented 
above on the identity of the parties initiating re-examinations, as well as the abundant 
evidence discussed earlier of significant procedural differences between the re-
examination and opposition processes, should dispel any such analogies. Any such 
                                                 
12 The latter statement is premised on the argument that more oppositions than suits are filed partly because 
they are lower cost.  Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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comparison of challenges must incorporate data on the next stages of these challenges, 
which in both Europe and the United States involve litigation.  
 
One of the concerns that is often raised about both litigation and post-grant administrative 
challenges is that they may be used by firms with deep pockets to harass smaller firms 
and independent inventors.
13 Although re-exam requests are slightly more likely if the 
patent is held by an independent inventor, there is little if any evidence that independent-
inventor patents are significantly more prone to EPO oppositions that other patents. This 
means that the opposition system in Europe is not being used by large players to harass 
small inventors.  
 
Nevertheless, the possibility of some strategic use of the system by competing firms 
cannot be ruled out. For example, Harhoff and Hall (2002) find that in the hair care 
industry, a German firms systematically oppose the patents of their multinational 
competitors and are not opposed in turn. Whether this is due to greater expertise and 
knowledge of the prior art or to greater familiarity with the use of the opposition system 
as a weapon is not clear.  
5  WELFARE GAINS FROM IMPROVED POST-GRANT REVIEW 
Would introducing an adversarial challenge system simply add another level of costly 
litigation to what is already there? Or does it have the potential to reduce the subsequent 
litigation? Answering this question is a complex task, given the difficulty of predicting 
the response of firms and individuals to a rather radical change in the administration of 
the patent system. Nevertheless, it is possible to perform some simple welfare 
computations based on plausible assumptions about the value of patent validity and the 
known costs of both the European and U.S. patent systems. As Levin and Levin (2002) 
argue in their discussion of the same issue, successful patent opposition is likely to 
reduce subsequent patent litigation substantially, increasing social welfare, but opposition 
itself brings forward cases that would not have gone to litigation and affects the terms on 
which firms are able to license the technology embedded in patents. They conclude that 
on balance there are likely to be substantial welfare gains from the introduction of an 
opposition system. In this section of the paper we present our own analysis of the 
consequences of this change and reach a similar conclusion.  
 
Successful opposition should reduce litigation because invalid patents could not then be 
litigated, although this might require a somewhat circumscribed appeals process that does 
not allow recourse to the courts. Unsuccessful opposition may still lead to litigation later 
and, unless barred by statute, successful opposition might also lead to later litigation on 
the part of the former patentholder. The net result of this is fewer suits filed, and possibly 
fewer collusive settlements based on the threat of a suit, although there might be an 
increase in collusive settlements based on the threat of opposition.  
 
                                                 
13 In fact, according to data reported by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2002) it is the other way around in the 
United States: small firms and independent inventors are far more likely to file infringement suits than 
larger firms. Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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The computation shown below makes these ideas more precise. We compute the social 
benefits and costs of introducing an opposition system under a few simple stylized 
assumptions. Although the precise numbers should be viewed somewhat sceptically, the 
order of magnitudes are such as to suggest that there may be substantial social gains from 
such a system. The total cost of the system per year is assumed to be given by 
 
  o CcN φ =  
 
where co is the cost of an opposition, φ  is the rate of opposition, and N is the total number 
of patents issued in a year. We assume a range of costs between $100,000 per opposition 
(the European estimate) and $500,000 (the cost assumed by Levin and Levin 2002), and a 
range of opposition rates between two per cent (very conservative) and ten per cent, 
which is approximately the rate in Europe. 
 
Computing the benefit of the system requires some assumptions about the effects of 
opposition outcomes on the costs associated with avoiding litigation, collusive pre-suit 
settlements, and the exercise of monopoly power. We write the benefit as 
 
  o B bN φ =  
 
with bo the cost avoided by each opposition and φ  and N as before. bo has three 
components, corresponding to the three possible outcomes of the opposition, revocation, 
amendment, or rejection. In order to estimate these components, we assume that the 
opposition and appeals boards take the correct decision when they revoke or amend a 
patent or when they reject an opposition.  
 
In the case of revocation that means that the patent should never have been granted, and 
that its existence may create excessive market power. Suppose that in litigation, the same 
correct outcome would be obtained, i.e., the patent right would be destroyed. Then -- as 
long as the respective case would have ended up in litigation -- opposition will simply 
preempt later litigation; the welfare effect is then to reduce the number of cases in 
litigation, at the cost of an opposition proceeding. We assign an average social value of 
$2 million dollars to avoided litigation, based on the estimates provided by AIPLA 
(2001) for legal costs plus an addition for the direct costs to the firms involved and the 
cost of court services. 
 
Since the parties may have an incentive to settle, not all cases will actually be litigated 
(Lanjouw and Schankerman 2002). But in this case, if the correct outcome would have 
been a revocation, a settlement between the parties will be socially inefficient, because it 
typically maintains the patent for the proprietor and allows the other party in litigation to 
have an exclusive license. This amounts to a case in which the two parties collusively 
maintain patent protection, which may impose considerable welfare costs on society.
14 
                                                 
14 This is the reason why the European Patent Office is entitled to pursue opposition cases on its own, even 
if the two parties wish to settle the case. Thus this feature of an opposition system can be expected to 
increase social welfare. Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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The welfare costs of such an agreement depend on the value of the patent right and 
demand conditions. As our base case, we assume that high value patents which are 
attacked in the opposition procedure have an average value of $4 million and therefore a 
monopoly welfare loss of $2 million.
15 For example, Harhoff, Scherer and Vopel (2003) 
compute an average value of about (1977) DM 400,000 for patents of German 
proprietors. They also estimate regressions which indicate that opposed patents which 
survived opposition are worth about ten times this amount. We assume that patents which 
were opposed but did not survive opposition would generate the same level of profits as 
patents that withstood opposition. In 2003 terms (assuming a 4 percent growth rate), the 
average value of an attacked patent would then be roughly 5.76 million euros 
(=1.04
27400,000/2). A conservative estimate of the value of the attacked patent is 
therefore $4 million on average, with welfare losses in the monopoly case of $2 million.  
 
In the case of amendment (where usually claims are narrowed), a similar argument holds, 
although the avoided litigation cost is likely to be much smaller. The results from 
opposition rejection are more ambiguous. It may reduce uncertainty about the patent 
validity and therefore reduce subsequent litigation, but this is by no means certain. In our 
base case, we assume no effect, and we also evaluate a variant where there is increased 
social cost due to an increase in litigation probability when opposition is rejected. 
 
In Table 4 we show the benefit cost computation under a variety of different scenarios. 
There are three panels, each corresponding to a set of assumptions about outcome 
probabilities: the first uses the probability that a U.S. patent is found valid during 
litigation reported by Allison and Lemley (2002). The second uses the observed 
opposition outcome probabilities for the EPO system and the third uses the observed re-
examination outcome probabilities of the USPTO system, both given in Table 2. The 
latter choice is very conservative and an opposition system is unlikely to lead to patent 
revocation probabilities as low as 11 per cent. For each of these three outcome scenarios, 
we report five computations, three using a (comparatively) low opposition cost and two 
using the higher estimate of $500,000 that was used by Levin and Levin. We also 
experiment with assuming a social cost for rejection and an avoided cost for patent 
amendment as well as for patent revocation.  
 
Almost all of the scenarios yield benefit-cost ratios well in excess of unity, with the 
exception of some of those that use the re-examination outcome probabilities. The lowest 
ratios for each panel are for the high opposition cost cases. We conclude that unless the 
opposition system is very expensive to operate and yields results similar to those now 
obtained with the re-examination system, it would be likely to generate substantial 
welfare gains.  
6 CONCLUSIONS  AND  FURTHER QUESTIONS 
The determinants and characteristics of patent challenge procedures are an important 
issue in any assessment of the U.S. or other industrial economies’ intellectual property 
systems. In a “knowledge-based” economy, intellectual property systems are constantly 
                                                 
15 With linear demand, the welfare loss from monopoly will be one half of the monopoly rents. Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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challenged by the advance of technology, a process that among other things creates new 
artifacts to which the necessarily backward-looking patent system must respond. A 
“knowledge-based” economy also is one in which the high political salience of national 
and global intellectual property systems means that they are the focus of political 
lobbying to strengthen, adapt, or weaken specific features of intellectual property 
regulation, administration, and law to favor particular interests. Both of these forces have 
been at work within the U.S. intellectual property system during the past quarter-century; 
a period of significant strengthening of patentholder rights has triggered a debate over the 
appropriate level and limits of such rights. Moreover, this debate has important trans-
Atlantic and global echoes and analogues. 
 
As the knowledge-based economy has evolved in the United States and elsewhere, it has 
become clear that such evolution brings with it increasing attention to the ownership of 
“knowledge” in the form of intellectual property by firm and governments. Together with 
the increasing importance of software in all areas, which is in itself an impetus to the 
growth of the knowledge-based economy, this has led to an expansion of the subject 
matter base that must be considered by patent offices everywhere. Such expansion is not 
a new phenomenon – it has tended to happen whenever there are important changes in 
technological regimes. But it does lead to two kinds of “adjustment” problems: first, 
debates over the validity of the subject matter extension, such as have occurred between 
the U.S. and Europe over business method patents, and second, a concern that overly 
broad and invalid patents may issue early in the development of the technology because 
of the lack of prior art in the relevant patent office databases, even though such prior art 
may exist among those who practice the technology. The second problem, which may 
broadly be defined as the difficulty of determining the validity of a patent application in 
new and less understood technologies, is the one that an inter partes post grant review or 
re-examination system might be designed to address.  
 
In order to understand how such a system might work, the analysis in this paper 
highlights several interesting features of the patent-challenge systems of the US and EPO 
systems. First, the current US re-examination procedure differs dramatically from the 
EPO opposition procedure in virtually all of its features, of which the most significant are 
the identity of the party requesting a re-examination (the patent owner in more than 40% 
of the cases) and the outcomes, which are rarely revocation of the patent. These 
characteristics of re-examination hardly qualify it as the sort of adversarial procedure that 
EPO oppositions represent, but they are not surprising when we consider the differences 
in structure between the two procedures: 1) A three-examiner panel including the original 
examiner, but not as chair, in the EPO versus a single examiner, often the same as the 
original examiner, in the USPTO; 2) the bar in later litigation to questions that could have 
been raised in a re-exam in the US; 3) the inter partes nature of the proceeding at the 
EPO versus ex parte at the USPTO. 
 
Keeping in mind the significant differences between the re-examination and opposition 
processes, our comparative analysis suggests that EPO oppositions are not significantly 
swifter in resolving challenges than the USPTO re-examination proceedings, as might be 
expected given their more adversarial nature. Indeed, opposition proceedings in some Hall et al./IPE    May 2003 
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cases (and almost certainly, in important, complex cases with numerous opponents, 
appeals, etc.) may well take as much time to be resolved as litigation in the US system. 
Nonetheless, the higher frequency of opposition (which is presumably due to the lower 
cost associated with opposition as compared to the cost of litigation in the US) within the 
EPO system suggests that this process handles many more legal disputes over patent 
validity than are addressed by the U.S. re-examination process. 
 
Our analysis also indicates that patent amendment, rather than revocation, is more likely 
for oppositions in relative new fields of inventive activity, for more “complex” patents, or 
for oppositions in which numerous opponents participate. Since we lack evidence on the 
extent to which oppositions are followed by litigation in the European patent system, we 
cannot determine whether the lack of any advantage for oppositions in resolving patent 
disputes quickly is offset by a reduction of litigation rates associated with oppositions. 
The EPO system may offer few advantages over the U.S. system for post-issue patent 
challenges, but we cannot address this issue without analyzing litigation data for both the 
U.S. and European systems Any comprehensive assessment of the social costs and 
benefits of the two challenge systems requires that we consider both the “patent office” 
processes of post-grant challenge (opposition or re-examination) and litigation. 
Nevertheless, the preliminary computations present here do suggest that the social gains 
from such a system might be substantial.  
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Multimedia search system using a plurality of 
entry path means which indicate 
interrelatedness of information 
broad claims that cover a multimedia CD-ROM 






Method, apparatus, and program for pricing, 
selling, and exercising options to purchase 
airline tickets 
An algorithm for constructing airline ticket option 
prices based on past demand, implemented on a 
computer
5,937,468 1999 Lucent Sine/cosine table lookup on a computer
use of a computer algorithm to perform the table 
lookup familiar from math textbooks to obtain the 
sine or cosine of an angle
5,963,916 1999 Intouch Group, Inc.
Network apparatus and method for preview of 
music products and compilation of market 
data 
patent on storing music on a server (with backup 
servers) and letting users listen to it by clicking on 
a list of music available
6,257,248 2001 NA Both hand hair cutting method
Cutting or styling hair using instruments such as 
scissors or combs in both hands
6,368,227 2002 NA Method of swinging on a swing
swinging a swing sideways or in a circular motion 
instead of back and forth by pulling on the chains 
(re-examined in 2003)
Table 1
Some Examples of Patents Whose Validity has been Questioned
21Outcome Total number Total share Total number Total share Total number Total share
No change to patent 5,590 22.4% 716 23.9% 476 25.9%
Patent amended  6,466 33.0% 1,993 66.4% 1,151 62.7%
Patent revoked  6,655 35.1% 291 9.7% 209 11.4%
Closed/no outcome 1,753 9.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Total with an outcome 20,464 100.0% 3,000 100.0% 1,836 100.0%
Pending 3,221 22.4% 902 23.1% 472 20.5%
Total 23,685 3,902 2,308





Outcomes from Oppositions (EPO) and Re-examinations (USPTO)
Opposition*
**Re-examination outcomes are for all re-exams filed between 1981 and 1998.
     Each re-exam appears only once. In the cases where there is more than one re-examination request, 




    Fees* $4,000 $4,624
    Legal costs $30,000 $5,914
    Translation NA $12,366
Renewal (10 years) $6,000 $9,140
Re-examination/Opposition
    Fees $2,520 $1,075
    Legal costs $10,000-$100,000 $21,505
Litigation $0.5M-$3M $54K-$540K
    
*These fees are for a non-small entity.
Numbers are in 2002 $, using an exchange rate of 0.93 euros to the dollar.
Figures are approximate.
Table 3
Estimated Patent Costs in the United States and Europe 
23Scenario











thousands probability probability probability thousands thousands thousands thousands
Validity prob from Allison & Lemley; 
low cost $100 0.450 0.300 0.250 $2,000 $0 $0 $900 9.0
Validity prob from Allison & Lemley; 
low cost $100 0.450 0.300 0.250 $2,000 $300 $0 $990 9.9
Validity prob from Allison & Lemley; 
high cost $500 0.450 0.300 0.250 $2,000 $0 $0 $900 1.8
Validity prob from Allison & Lemley; 
low cost; rejection raises cost $100 0.450 0.300 0.250 $2,000 $0 -$200 $850 8.5
Validity prob from Allison & Lemley; 
high cost; rejection raises cost. $500 0.450 0.300 0.250 $2,000 $0 -$200 $850 1.7
Opp. Outcome probabilities; low cost $100 0.350 0.330 0.320 $2,000 $0 $0 $700 7.0
Opp. Outcome probabilities; low cost $100 0.350 0.330 0.320 $2,000 $300 $0 $799 8.0
Opp. Outcome probabilities; high cost $500 0.350 0.330 0.320 $2,000 $0 $0 $700 1.4
Opp. Outcome probabilities; low cost; 
rejection raises cost $100 0.350 0.330 0.320 $2,000 $0 -$200 $636 6.4
Opp. Outcome probabilities; high; 
rejection raises cost  $500 0.350 0.330 0.320 $2,000 $0 -$200 $636 1.3
Re-exam outcome probabilities; low 
cost $100 0.110 0.630 0.260 $2,000 $0 $0 $220 2.2
Re-exam outcome probabilities; low 
cost $100 0.110 0.630 0.260 $2,000 $300 $0 $409 4.1
Re-exam outcome probabilities; high 
cost $500 0.110 0.630 0.260 $2,000 $0 $0 $220 0.4
Re-exam outcome probabilities; low 
cost; rejection raises cost $100 0.110 0.630 0.260 $2,000 $0 -$200 $168 1.7
Re-exam outcome probabilities; high 
cost; rejection raises cost $500 0.110 0.630 0.260 $2,000 $0 -$200 $168 0.3
Table 4
Welfare Computation under Different Scenarios
Outcome Probabilities Benefits (avoided cost)
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Figure 1
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